Aid for trade and the quality of exports

This article studies how aid for trade (AfT) affects the quality of recipient countries’ exports. It shows that the quality effect is most discernible for AfT for assistance in trade policy: a 50% increase in the value of AfT received in this category is associated with a 0.5–1% increase in the quality of exports to the donor and other OECD countries. On average, the actual AfT received for assistance in trade policy leads to a 2% upgrade of the recipient country in the quality ladder of all developing countries. Around half of this quality effect is driven by the quality improvement of continued products in continued markets (intensive margin), and the other half by the quality upgrading of new products in continued markets and existing products in new markets (extensive margin).     

Model-based control charts in phase 1 statistical process control

In this paper, a general method of constructing control charts for preliminary analysis of individual observations is presented, which is based on recursive score residuals. A simulation study shows that certain implementations of these charts are highly effective in detecting assignable causes.     

Structuring Corporate Headquarters: An Investigation of Franchising

This article focuses on the structuring of the corporate headquarters in a franchise organization. Four essential issues that are related to franchisors organizational structure are discussed—homogeneity and heterogeneity of franchisors structure, company-owned and franchise arrangement, the dynamics between strategy and structure, and performing innovative and administrative functions simultaneously in the headquarters. Propositions are given for each issue. The results of qualitative analysis associated with each issue are discussed.     

Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights

This paper examines the growth effects of intellectual property right (IPR) protection in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth. Stronger IPR protection, which reduces the imitation probability, increases the reward for innovation. However, stronger protection also gradually reduces the number of competitive sectors, in which innovation is easier than in monopolistic sectors. With free entry to R&D, the number of researchers in each remaining competitive sector increases, but the concentration of R&D activity raises the possibility of unnecessary duplication of innovation, thereby hindering growth. Consequently, imperfect rather than perfect protection maximizes growth. Welfare and scale effects are also examined.     

Multiple equilibria in the Aghion–Howitt model

We show that the simple Aghion–Howitt model exhibits oscillatory indeterminacy in the process of creative destruction as firms undertaking new research do not internalize their effect on existing firms. A simple calibration shows that indeterminacy occurs for quite plausible parametrizations of the share of the intermediate good.     

设施直线型自动布置的算法之二

基于从至表矩阵变换,给出了设施直线型自动布置一种算法,数值实验表明这种方法是十分有效的。     

一种基于雷达图的雷达辐射源识别算法

在分析和考察雷达辐射源(Radar Emitter)多特征模式识别算法的基础上提出了一种基于雷达图(Radar Chart)中向量夹角余弦值的分类识别算法,借助雷达图实现了雷达辐射源空间特征向量向平面向量的转换,实现对雷达辐射源型号的自动识别,给出识别置信度.通过计算机仿真得到大于85%的正确识别率,进一步验证了算法在雷达辐射源识别工程中的可用性和可行性.     

浅谈公路工程项目施工网络图的优化

文章针对传统的公路施工网络图优化中存在的问题和不足,运用启发式搜索算法和遗传算法,对公路施工网络优化从时间、费用、资源三方面进行网络计划的优化和调整。     

均值-极差控制图在阀门质量控制中的应用

产品的质量控制是企业获取市场的重要保证。针对阀门关键质量指标,结合企业生产现场采集阀门直径数据,借助minitab软件对所测得的数据进行统计处理,绘制出阀门直径的均值-极差(-R)图,据此断判出生产过程的质量控制状态,为阀门生产过程的质量控制提供了保障。     

Technology ladders and R&D in dynamic Cournot markets

Motivated by dramatic and unpredictable technological advances in energy production (for instance drilling and extraction of shale oil), we extend Cournot models of competition to incorporate research and development (R&D) that can lead to (stochastic) drops in production costs. Our model combines features of patent racing with dynamic market structure, capturing the interplay between the immediate competition in terms of production rates and the long-term competition in R&D. The resulting Markov Nash equilibrium is found from a sequence of one-step static games arising between R&D successes, and several numerical examples and extensive analysis of the emerging comparative statics are presented. Analyzing the relationship between current market dominance and the level of R&D investments, we find that market leaders tend to invest more, which in some sense makes oligopoly dynamically unstable. We show that anticipated market transitions have long-term impact; for example the potential of future monopoly can spur R&D investment now, even if the firm is presently uncompetitive and not actively producing. We also show that, surprisingly, random innovations have an ambiguous effect on R&D. This feature, which is driven by the Cournot framework, contrasts with the common situation whereby uncertainty lowers innovation and delays R&D investments. Finally, we demonstrate that increased competition may actually increase efforts to innovate through higher desire to achieve dominance. This would match the anecdotal evidence that the threat of market entrants forces incumbents to maintain high R&D.